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Corporate Social Disclosures: A User Perspective on 
Assurance 
 
Introduction 
 
The developing importance of assurance [1] on sustainable reporting is 
emphasised (Perego, 2009), as bodies such as AccountAbility and The Global 
Reporting Initiative recommend that corporate social disclosures (CSD) [2] 
should be assured (Kolk and Perego, 2010).  CSD assurance is important in 
validating CSD and enhancing its credibility and stakeholder confidence.  
Despite increased importance, CSD assurance remains relatively under-
researched.  This paper contributes to this emerging area through a 
systematic investigation of stakeholder demand for, and perceptions of, CSD 
assurance within a sampling frame which recognises the diverse stakeholder 
groups that firms face when developing CSD reporting strategies (Azzone et 
al., 1997).  Stakeholder needs are examined to further understanding on 
stakeholder requirements for CSD assurance. 
  
Very few studies have examined systematically stakeholder perceptions of 
CSD assurance.  Extant studies investigated the geographic and industrial 
incidence of (Kolk and Perego, 2010) and organisational motivations for CSD 
assurance (Park and Brorson, 2005), the credibility of independent assurance 
from an expert’s perspective (Mock et al., 2007), the legitimation processes 
adopted by CSD assurors (O’Dwyer et al., 2011), the credibility provided to 
CSD from the perspective of assurors (O’Dwyer, 2011) and managerial 
perceptions of CSD assurance (Jones and Solomon, 2010).  While assurance 
may increase the credibility of environmental reporting (Tilt, 2008), others are 
less convinced of its value (Jones and Solomon, 2010).  Some studies have 
inquired the extent to which CSD assurance has been stakeholder inclusive, 
they were however conducted from an assuror’s perspective (Edgley et al., 
2010).  Doubts were cast over assurors’ independence (Gray, 2000) and the 
incomplete character of assurance exercises (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2007).  
Ball et al. (2000) found evidence of auditee control over the assurance 
process, and the current practice exhibits a managerial response rather than a 
commitment to transparency and accountability. O’Dwyer and Owen (2007) 
stated assurance is characterised by scope limitations, and accountant 
assurors tend to refer to data accuracy rather than performance issues.  In 
any case, not much is known about stakeholder perceptions of CSD 
assurance. 
 
Although prior work argued CSD and its assurance should be focussed on the 
needs of the stakeholders upon whom the accounting organisation has an 
impact (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2007), relatively little is known about either the 
usefulness of CSD to stakeholders or their assurance requirements.  
Investigations tend to focus on the usefulness of CSD to either financial 
(Campbell and Slack, 2008) or non-governmental organisation (NGOs) 
(Danastas and Gadenne, 2006) stakeholders.  Stakeholder type has 
implications on the demand for CSD and its perceived credibility, and non-
financial stakeholders generally show greater demand for environmental 
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disclosures and less trust in the information reported (Kuruppu & Milne, 2010).  
Stakeholders were also found to see such disclosures as insufficient and 
lacking in credibility, emphasising the “legitimating effect” of assurance 
(Kuruppu & Milne, 2010, p.4).  Further, few have examined the demand 
drivers for the voluntary adoption of assurance and the role of stakeholders in 
this process (Carey et al., 2000).  Voluntary assurance is most commonly 
investigated from an agency perspective based on managerial perceptions, 
and findings suggest firms are more likely to use assurance if influenced by 
external stakeholders.  Darnall et al. (2009) found the incidence of 
environmental audit positively related to perceived external stakeholder 
influence, while Park and Brorson (2005) stated companies may not seek 
assurance because stakeholder pressure is lacking.  Furthermore, a “general 
absence of stakeholder participation in the assurance process” has been 
observed (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005, p.205).     
 
Underpinned by stakeholders’ needs to draw on information from multiple 
sources to support decision-making and the monitoring function of assurance 
on managers, this paper has 2 objectives.  First, we examine stakeholder 
demand for and perceptions of CSD assurance and stakeholder preferences 
for assurance.  Second, we analyse the determinants of stakeholder demand 
for CSD assurance.  The objectives are addressed through surveying the 
views of 147 organisations that were drawn from 3 key stakeholder groups: 
institutional investors, procurers and third sector organisations [3].   
 
This study is timely as there is increasing attention on CSD (O’Dwyer, 2011).  
The participation of organisations in the pilot scheme for Integrated Reporting 
(IR) in 2011 has further highlighted the value of CSD (IIRC, 2013).  O’Dwyer 
(2011) also remarked that assurance is one of the means through which the 
reliability and the completeness of CSD can be assured.  Thus, it is important 
to attain better understanding of stakeholder perceptions of the value of CSD 
assurance. 
The study makes three contributions to the literature.  
 
1. CSD assurance is a recent phenomenon (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Islam & Deegan, 2008; Kolk et al., 2008; Kuruppu & Milne, 2010) and 
therefore there is limited understanding of the nature of its demand (Perego, 
2009).  An empirical study will help further understanding of stakeholder 
requirements in CSD assurance. 
 
2. We focus on stakeholder demands for, and perceptions of, CSD assurance.  
Most studies on CSD assurance are motivated from a corporate or 
practitioners’ perspective, in terms of what information should be reported 
(O’Dwyer and Owen, 2007).  Little attention is given to what users of CSD 
assurance consider important; and yet, it is these stakeholders at whom CSD 
and its assurance are targeted.   
 
3. Our approach is based on a multiple stakeholder perspective which 
includes institutional investors, procurers and third sector organisations. 
Edgley et al. (2010) identified a lack of stakeholder inclusivity in assurance for 
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such disclosures.  More attention to the needs of non-investing stakeholder 
would help make CSD assurance more decision useful for those stakeholders. 
 
Our findings have significant implications for companies and regulators.  While 
CSD assurance is becoming increasingly salient, regulatory requirements on 
CSD assurance remain limited.  The European Commission only requires 
companies that have joined the Eco Management & Audit Scheme to 
commission verification of the environmental statement (Park and Brorson, 
2005). Better understanding of stakeholder perceptions of, and demand for, 
CSD assurance will better inform regulators.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 1 discusses the 
key studies that inform a conceptual framework for this study.  The research 
design and method of the empirical study is discussed next.  Findings are 
then discussed in Section 3.  The concluding section presents the implications 
of this paper as well as suggestions for future studies. 
 
Section 1 – Conceptual Development 
 
The Demand for Voluntary Assurance 
 
Stakeholders not only require accurate and valid information about corporate 
social and environmental impacts to support decision-making but use multiple 
sources of information to ensure decisions made are well-informed.  Given the 
questionable quality of CSD, effective third party assurance and information 
from other sources are expected to play a key role in validating CSD.  Further, 
assurance can be used as a tool to monitor company managers.  One of the 
forms of environmental audit or assurance identified by Darnall et al. (2009) is 
external assurance.  This is the focus of this paper.  A firm hires an external 
assessor to examine its environmental practices.  External audits represent a 
response to stakeholder demands for independent validation and reporting 
(Power, 1997) and confer objectivity and independence (Karapetrovic and 
Willborn, 2001).  In considering these potential benefits, firms can be 
expected to spend resources on CSD assurance. 
 
 
Multiple Information Cues  
 
Given the inadequate quality of CSD (Boiral, 2013), we posit that the demand 
for CSD assurance will be determined by stakeholder perceptions of the value 
of CSD and third-party information supplied by information intermediaries.  
The model of perceptions of information value and attributes is underpinned 
by the Brunswik Lens model.  The use of this model was first found in the 
psychology literature (Birnberg and Shields, 1989) and was adapted by Libby 
(1975) to examine “user oriented issues” in accounting (Birnberg and Shields, 
1989, p.45).  Users rely on multiple cues to make decisions.  While some cues 
may be more important than the others, no individual cue or combinations of 
cues is a perfect predictor of events (Libby, 1981).  This indicates that 
stakeholders make decisions based on information from multiple sources. It is 
unlikely any one of the sources or any information attribute alone is 
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independently and sufficiently adequate in supporting decision-making.  If 
stakeholders find information on corporate social and environmental 
performance valuable, they may also draw on other information that includes 
CSD, assurance statements, socially responsible investment indices and 
private disclosures to support decision-making.  Notwithstanding, given that 
socially responsible investment has grown significantly over the past decade 
(Solomon et al., 2011) and institutional investors were found to be driving 
private one-to-one meetings with companies (Roberts et al., 2006), 
companies may be expected to make available private meetings 
predominantly for investing stakeholders.  Regarding assurance, Simnett et al. 
(2009) remarked that it is discretionary and costly for companies.  If 
companies choose to purchase assurance, benefits such as enhanced 
credibility (IAASB, 2004; and Tilt, 2008) should outweigh the costs. 
 
 
Assurance as a Tool for Monitoring and Control 
 
Prior studies examined audit/assurance as a monitoring mechanism which is 
integral to agency theory, and those studies tend to examine managers’ 
demand for voluntary assurance.  For example Watts and Zimmerman (1983) 
stated that many company managers voluntarily subjected corporate reports 
to scrutiny and such actions will ultimately be rewarding for managers.  This is 
consistent with the use of audits as a monitoring tool to strengthen the 
credibility of corporate information (Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987).  Simnett et 
al. (2009) noted that few empirical studies that examined the drivers for 
voluntary adoption of assurance existed and most focused on the drivers for 
companies to purchase assurance (Carey et al., 2000).  Hence there are very 
few (if any at all) studies that examine the demand drivers for assurance from 
a non-managerial stakeholder perspective.   
 
Moreover, some stakeholders may monitor company managers on their own.  
Consistent with stakeholder theory, companies are more proactive in CSD 
towards stakeholders who appear to be more powerful (Magness, 2006), and 
private disclosures were made available to selected and powerful 
stakeholders.  Roberts et al. (2006) suggested some investors can exercise 
control over investee companies through private financial disclosures.  Given 
that private CSD are often regarded as highly valuable (Solomon and 
Solomon, 2006), stakeholders may feel adequately assured by information 
stemming from private disclosures which may diminish their need to consult 
CSD assurance statements and public reporting.   
 
Kolk and Perego (2010) noted assurance fulfils an important role in ensuring 
control over the quality of CSD, however, the extant evidence on its value is 
mixed (Edgley et al., 2010; O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; 2007).  There exist 
uncertainties regarding the value of assurance due to the varying content of 
assurance statements and approaches to verification (Deegan et al., 2006).  
Notwithstanding, CSD assurance seems instrumental in increasing the 
credibility of reporting (Kolk and Perego, 2010).  Stakeholder demand for 
assurance is associated with its monitoring role that is beneficial to both 
managers and users of CSD.  
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Assurance may help increase stakeholder confidence in the integrity of CSD, 
but only if stakeholders can rely upon assurance statements.  Some studies 
found stakeholders do not consider assurance statements overly trustworthy. 
Often this is due to the questionable independence of assurors (Ball et al., 
2000; O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005), and stakeholders tend to place more trust 
on assurance provided by consultants who are not financial auditors. The 
issue of stakeholder confidence is intertwined with stakeholder perceptions of 
the assurors’ independence.  O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) differentiated 2 types 
of assurors, namely accountant assurors and consultant assurors.  Previous 
studies provide mixed evidence in terms of which 1 of the 2 types of assurors 
provide higher quality assurance.  Assurance provided by accountant 
assurors seems more limited in approach and thus is of lower assurance 
levels, while assurance provided by consultant assurors are of higher levels 
due to its more evaluative nature (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005).   “Big N” 
accounting/audit firms are more effective monitors than smaller auditors, due 
to their higher stakes in terms of reputational capital (Simnett et al., 2009).  
The demand for CSD assurance depends on the level of stakeholder trust of 
assurors, which is influenced by perceptions of assurors’ independence.   
 
While the first research objective regarding perceptions of CSD assurance 
can be achieved by examining responses to the open-form questions in the 
survey instrument in the first half of Section 3, the demand for assurance can 
be investigated through statistical analyses of causal relationships between 
the demand for assurance and its determinants in the second half of Section 
3.  A discussion that underpins a model of stakeholder demand for assurance 
follows in the next section.   
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
User Perceptions of the Value of CSD  
 
We posit that stakeholder demand for CSD assurance will be positively 
related to stakeholder perceived value of CSD in decision-making, since 
stakeholders wish to ensure information that is central to decision-making is 
both decision-useful and validated by more than one source.  Recent 
institutional and legal developments have emphasised the value of CSD for a 
range of stakeholders that includes but is not restricted to institutional 
investors.  
 
Institutional investors have come under increasing pressure to encompass 
social performance in investment selection.  UK pension funds have been 
subject to regulatory, institutional and social pressures to consider business 
social responsibility in investment decisions. These pressures have 
encompassed legal requirements to state their investment principles and to 
identify the role of social, environmental and ethical considerations in 
investment planning (HMSO, 1999), the setting of social agendas by industry 
trade bodies (e.g. National Association of Pension Funds, 2013; Local 
Authority Pension Fund Forum, 2007) and significant public interest in socially 
responsible investment (The Ethical Investor, 1999) [4].  The importance of 
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actively managing social and environmental risks has also been heightened 
by the application of the recommendations in a report published by the 
Turnbull Committee in 1999.  Since December 2000, all listed companies are 
required to state to what extent environmental and other reputation related 
risk has been managed (Miles et al., 2002).  Moreover, the establishment of 
FTSE4Good in July 2001 has further heightened the importance of CSD.   
 
Sustainable public procurement has also acquired more prominence.  The 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 called for governments to 
promote public procurement policies that encourage the development and 
diffusion of environmentally sound goods and services (WSSD, 2002).  In 
2005, the UK government stated its goal to be amongst the leaders in Europe 
on sustainable procurement by 2009 (Walker and Brammer, 2009).  These 
developments have seen a cascade of sustainable procurement requirements 
at all levels of government. 
 
Also, the emerging salience of climate change and greater consumer 
awareness has heightened the reputational risk associated with poor CSR 
performance.  These developments have focussed the attention and 
increased the power of NGOs (Brammer and Millington, 2004).  NGOs play an 
important role in representing the view of specific groups of people in society 
or on certain issues (The European Commission, 2000).  NGOs and third 
sector organisations such as Greenpeace, among others, are active users of 
CSD. 
 
The above developments emphasise the value of CSD to stakeholders.  CSD 
assurance is seen to be growing at a similar pace with CSD (Deegan et al., 
2006), which suggests that stakeholders may perceive complementary 
decision-making value in both sources of information.  Given the importance 
of CSD in supporting decision-making, we expect stakeholders who attach a 
high value to CSD to require CSD assurance that attests to the credibility of 
CSD. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the perceived value of 
CSD and stakeholder demands for CSD assurance. 
 
 
Stakeholder’s Use of Information Intermediaries 
 
Apart from CSD assurance, another way to obtain reassurance on CSD is 
through information supplied by information intermediaries (infomediaries) 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Infomediaries are formal organisations that 
provide mediated information to audiences; they collect and distribute 
information about companies and social issues and inform users what they do 
not experience directly and can render otherwise remote happenings 
“observable and meaningful” (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009, p.542).  
Responsible investment indices (RII) are collectively a key source of 
information on corporate social and environmental performance as they 
provide information that validates CSD. 
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In the capital market, inclusion in RII is a strong signal about a company’s 
commitment to managing environmental and social risk (Harding, 2006).  The 
production and the quality of CSD is often used as one component in the 
screening process for including companies in ethical indices (Walmsley and 
Bond, 2003). The FTSE4Good index has, for example, excluded several 
FTSE100 companies, simply because of a perceived lack of information, 
which could have been provided in CSD (Skorecki and Targett, 2001).  The 
inclusion of a company’s shares in a RII provides validation of the company’s 
CSD.  Thus both CSD assurance and RII are regarded as complementary 
sources of information that support CSD.    
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive relationship between stakeholder’s use of 
responsible investment index and stakeholder demand for CSD 
assurance. 
 
User Perceptions of the Quality of the Reported Data 
 
Assurance has emerged as part of the monitoring mechanism in CSD.  
Hammond and Miles (2004) stated that given CSD operates largely 
voluntarily, it is important that stakeholders can assess the quality of CSD for 
such reporting to be useful, though the criteria for assessing the quality of 
CSD are highly subjective (Walmsley and Bond, 2003).    For CSD to be 
decision-useful information should be relevant and it should faithfully 
represent the underlying activities of a firm: it should be free from any major 
bias and error (GRI, 2006).  CSD assurance may help organisations escape 
perceptions of green wash (Simnett et al., 2009).  Increased credibility of the 
reporting will culminate in improved relationship with stakeholders that may 
lead to increased stakeholder confidence (Wallage, 2000).  Given that the 
main purpose of CSD assurance is to provide an independent opinion on CSD 
to enhance its credibility (Kuruppu & Milne, 2010), the more biased CSD is 
perceived to be, the more stakeholders will value assurance.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between the demand for CSD 
assurance and stakeholder perceptions that CSD is unbiased 
 
Access to Private Corporate Disclosures 
 
Information obtained at private meetings with managers is considered very 
high quality and valuable (Solomon and Solomon, 2006).  Park and Brorson 
(2005) advocated that companies do not use third party assurance because 
direct contact with stakeholders and specialists are adequate substitutes.  
However, obtaining information of such high quality is resource intensive.  Al-
Hawamdeh and Snaith (2005) found a dialogue-assisted monitoring process 
through one-to-one meetings between institutional investors, fund managers, 
analysts and company managers costly.  The cost, in terms of time spent, 
suggests corporate managers are selective when offering private meetings.  
Reporting entities may perceive different stakeholders to have different 
degrees of powerfulness (O’Dwyer et al., 2005), and that firms are more 
proactive towards those who are more powerful (Buhr, 2002).  Although 
evidence suggests firms may consider institutional investors, major customers 
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and third sector organisations important stakeholders in CSD (Collison et al., 
2003; Stikker, 1992; and Tilt, 2007), differences may be expected between 
stakeholder groups (Mitchell et al., 1997) due to the different stakeholder 
characteristics.  Given that stakeholders operate on the budget constraints of 
time, stakeholders who have access to private disclosures are less likely to 
use CSD assurance. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between stakeholder access to 
private corporate disclosures and stakeholder demand for CSD 
assurance. 
 
Controls  
Stakeholder resources are negatively related to the demand for CSD 
assurance.  Better resourced organisations are more likely to have the 
capacity to carry out research and validation of CSD.  Also, different 
stakeholder groups may exhibit different preferences in their demand for CSD 
assurance.  Thus, stakeholders across groups will be compared for their 
responses; however, we have no prior expectation about significance or 
causality. 
 
The influences on the demand for CSD assurance is expressed as a logistic 
regression model which is stated below – 
 
Demand for CSD  
Assurance 
= f (Value of CSD to Users, Use of Infomediaries, 
   CSD Unbiasedness, Access to Private Disclosures,  
   Controls) 
 
Section 2 – Research Design and Method 
 
Data Collection 
 
In this study, the views of key stakeholders were surveyed through a 
questionnaire which is consistent with the research methods employed in 
O’Dwyer et al. (2005).  This study gauges stakeholder perceptions and so 
closed-ended questions are considered most appropriate.  Responses to 
closed-ended questions were requested on either a 5-point Likert scale, or 
through assigning points (specifically the proportions of time spent on 
information sources that add up to 100%).  To capture the richness of 
stakeholder perspectives (Denscombe, 1998) 2 open-ended questions were 
included.  The Likert scale responses were analysed with non-parametric 
statistical tests which do not require interval data (Moser and Kalton, 1975).  
The survey instrument was pre-tested on one participant each from the 3 
stakeholder groups surveyed to identify and resolve any possible issues of 
ambiguity but none were found. 
 
Studies that involve questionnaires or surveys are becoming increasingly 
common in accountability research (Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  Given the 
resource constraints, this paper adopts telephone survey.  It is also consistent 
with the method adopted by O’Dwyer et al. (2005), although data in that study 
was collected predominantly by postal questionnaires.  Telephone surveys are 
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considered better than postal surveys in terms of response rates and facilitate 
interactive communication with the participants, as any potential ambiguities 
can be addressed and resolved instantly.     
 
Sample Selection 
 
In contrast to most earlier “user studies” (O’Dwyer et al., 2005; Solomon and 
Solomon, 2006; and Tilt, 1994; 2004), this study seeks to identify perceptions 
from more than one stakeholder group.  Empirical evidence suggests firms 
tend to consider investing professionals (Investing), local authorities 
(Procuring) and NGOs (Third Sector) as stakeholder groups that are important 
to firms in terms of CSD (Konrad et al., 2006).   
 
Samples were selected on a judgmental approach and extracted from 2 non-
overlapping sources.  The first source was the UK Social Investment Forum 
(UKSIF) as at December 2007 which provided a listing of entities who 
expressed an interest in corporate social performance and the 2008 Yearbook 
of the Society of Procurement Officers (SOPO) in Local Government was the 
second source.  Investing stakeholders and third sector stakeholders were 
drawn from UKSIF.  In this study, “investing stakeholders” denotes investment 
analysts, investment managers and investment researchers, while “third 
sector stakeholders” were not-for-profit entities on the UKSIF listing.  The 
SOPO Yearbook listed contact details of major public procurers of goods and 
services.  Procuring stakeholders worked for public organisations and were to 
procure goods and services while taking account of sustainability.  This 
resulted in a target population of 494 entities from the 3 discrete stakeholder 
groups. 
 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
The first research objective is addressed through analysing stakeholder 
responses to the open-ended questions in the first half of Section 3.  
Stakeholders indicated whether they used CSD assurance. If they did, they 
would be asked to indicate the form of assurance they preferred. Stakeholders 
were provided with prompts indicating the type of CSD assurance providers 
that are most commonly used (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; 2007).   The 
respondents’ explanation of their preference for one type of assurors revealed 
their perception of different types of assurors.  The respondents were also 
asked to indicate which type of CSD assurance report they preferred.  This 
question of choice stemmed from a concern on the variability and ambiguity 
within the contents of CSD assurance statements (Deegan et al., 2006).  
Prompts were provided, again drawing on findings in prior studies (O’Dwyer 
and Owen, 2005; 2007).  Respondents who did not use CSD assurance were 
asked to explain their decision.  Subjects were asked to recall recent 
experience that involved the use of CSD.  The qualitative analysis was 
conducted while informed by a review of relevant extant studies, which has 
made possible the coding of stakeholder responses into categories.     
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Variable Measurement 
 
Further to analysing stakeholder perceptions of CSD assurance, factors that 
influence stakeholder demand for CSD assurance are explored with logistics 
regression in the second half of Section 3.  The variables used in the 
regression are explained below. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable (the demand for CSD assurance) is measured using 
a dummy dependent variable (Assurance).  This takes a value 1 if the 
respondents reply positively to the question “Do you check whether corporate 
social and environmental reporting has been verified by an independent third 
party?” and 0 otherwise.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
The value of CSD is measured using a variable (Value) which is based on 
responses to the question “How valuable is CSD to your work?”  Responses 
are measured on a 5-point Likert scale, 1 being not very valuable, 5 being 
very valuable.  To measure the importance of infomediaries, respondents 
were asked to identify “how important inclusion in the FTSE4Good Index as 
an indicator of environmental and social performance” on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 not important, 5 very important) (FTSE4Good) [5].  CSD 
unbiasedness is estimated using a 5-point Likert scale based on the question 
“Is CSD free from bias?” This takes a value 1 for strongly disagree and 5 for 
strongly agree (Unbiased).   
 
Access to private disclosures is estimated as the percentage of the 
stakeholder’s time spent on using private information (Private), relative to 
information from corporate reports and infomediaries.  Time is limited for both 
providers and users of information.  Users being rational will only spend time 
on information which contributes to decision-making.  Given that face to face 
contact is considered the most important form of communication which is 
carefully planned between companies and stakeholders (Armitage and 
Marston, 2008), the percentage of time spent on private information by users 
is deemed an important independent variable in this research.  
 
Likert-type scales are widely used due to their relative ease of construction 
and the fewer statistical assumptions involved (Karavas-Doukas, 1996).  This 
also helps respondents complete the questionnaire, because less cognitive 
processing is required due to a standardized format (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
However, a limitation of Likert-type scales is respondents may respond with 
overwhelmingly neutral scores (Oppenheim, 1992).  To minimise this possible 
bias, consistent with previous studies (Powell et al., 2005), open-ended 
questions were included to invite comments as responses to those questions. 
 
With respect to the control variables, stakeholder size was measured by the 
logged value of the percentage of time spent by employees on using CSD 
(LNStaff). Stakeholder type was measured by a set of dummy variables which 
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took the value 1 for investors (Investing), local authorities (Procuring) and third 
sector organisations (Third Sector) respectively. 
 
Model Specification 
 
The full empirical model is –  
 
Assurance  = α + β1Value + β2Use of FTSE4Good – β3Unbiased– β4Private - 
β5LNStaff + β6DummyThirdSector + β7DummyInvesting + 
β8DummyProcuring + ε 
 
and is estimated using logistic regression.  The dependent variable, which is 
stakeholder demand for CSD assurance, is a binary variable. 
 
In the next section the response rate and the findings are presented.  
Descriptive statistics are presented first, supported by a discussion that is 
informed by responses to the open-ended questions.  Regression results of 
responses to the closed-ended questions are presented and the findings 
discussed towards the end of the next section.    
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Section 3 – Findings and Discussion 
 
Response Rates 
 
Between January and October 2008 147 organisations were surveyed (see 
Table 1 and Table 2).  The response rate is approximately 30%.  Stakeholder 
responses reported here are findings of a wider study which concerned 
stakeholder perceptions of the value of CSD.  All quotes are identified by 
alphanumeric codes denoting industrial connections (i, P and T denote 
Investing, Procuring and Third Sector respectively).  Prior to administering the 
survey, respondents were contacted either by phone or email and supplied 
with information on CSD and the study, and all respondents were identified as 
users of CSD.  The responses of a random selection of participants who took 
part during the first 2 months of data collection were compared against the 
responses of respondents of the final 3 months.  There is no evidence of non-
response bias. 
 
[Table 1 – Insert Here] 
 
[Table 2 – Insert Here] 
 
Procuring subjects comprised the biggest group of respondents.  To ascertain 
whether any differences in stakeholder preference of any one group would 
unduly affect the overall results, dummy variables of stakeholder groups were 
included in the regression.  The lack of a better balance of the 3 stakeholder 
groups will be further discussed in the concluding section as a limitation of this 
study. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
[Table 3 – Insert Here] 
 
 
Slightly more than half of the stakeholders use assurance.  Results suggest 
most investing stakeholders use CSD assurance, which is supported by 
evidence that investors in general are risk adverse and therefore “needing 
very high levels of assurance” (Edgley et al., 2010, p.552).   Most third sector 
stakeholders also use CSD assurance.  Third sector stakeholders in general 
may not trust corporations (Sinclair and Walton, 2003), including corporate 
communication, and thus third sector stakeholders seek information that 
validates corporate reporting.  Not many procuring stakeholders use CSD 
assurance, which is inconsistent with previous findings that procurers closely 
monitor CSR activities and discuss findings with suppliers (Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2010), and that major customers actively demand CSD (Grubnic 
and Owen, 2010).  It is possible that procurers in this study are more 
concerned with the functionality of goods and services and do not accord the 
highest priority to CSD assurance. 
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Only 56% of the respondents use CSD assurance despite all the potential 
benefits they can derive from that.  Almost 75% of investing and third sector 
stakeholders check whether CSD has been assured by a third party, while 
only 42% of procurers do so.  Descriptive statistics indicate this inter-group 
difference is due to the value placed on CSD by the different groups (also see 
Table 6).  
 
To further explore the factors which underpin the decision to use assurance, 
respondents who did not use assurance were asked to identify the reasons.  
Almost 31% questioned the relevance of CSD assurance, but most of these 
respondents were major procurers who might have better access to private 
disclosures.  Trust is both an important factor and a key differentiator between 
stakeholder groups.  Among third sector and investing stakeholders who did 
not use CSD assurance, almost half suggested they did not trust assurance, 
whereas none of the procurers suggested that this was an issue.   
 
The Quality of Assurance Statements 
 
CSD assurance is essential in reinforcing the importance of non-financial data 
by some organisations (Hopwood et al., 2010).  The reliability of CSD can be 
enhanced by attestation by a third party (Holder-Webb et al., 2009).  Findings 
indicate many stakeholders do not use assurance which is consistent with the 
suggestion that the value of CSD assurance is questionable despite its growth 
(Edgley et al., 2010).  The decision not to use CSD assurance can be 
attributed to the quality of the statements.  Respondent i34 remarked 
“assurance is not necessarily adding value to the ground”.  Others also 
commented –  
 
“We just don't use … assurance - look at Enron and Arthur Andersen” 
(Respondent T9) 
 
“… auditing has caused problem, particularly in the clothing sector. At 
present it fails more than succeeds in identifying issues and specialist 
auditors' quality varies dramatically” (Respondent T14) 
 
Deegan et al. (2006) suggested the variability in the content of assurance 
statements undermines their contribution and the inconsistent approach to 
verification has adversely affected the credibility of verification with 
stakeholders.  In assurance engagements, formal procedure is privileged over 
transparent communication (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).   Further, in a case study 
of CSD assurance process, only selected areas were formally assured by a 
third party (Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2010), thus rendering such assurance 
biased.  Therefore, CSD assurance statements may be seen as deficient as a 
communication mechanism and there is a need to increase their clarity.  The 
nature of CSD assurance is seen as “less quantified, more elusive and less 
easy to assure” than financial data, and thus CSD assurance is far more 
difficult to achieve (Jones and Solomon, 2010, p.29).   
 
The value of CSD assurance may also be influenced by perceptions of the 
extent of any expectations gap.  Kells (2011, p.386) stated the possibility of 
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users of assurance “overestimating the strength of assurance”.  This seems to 
be affecting the usefulness of CSD assurance, apart from the variability of 
assurance statements and the assurance process.  Moreover, judging from 
respondent T9’s comment above, perceived independence between reportees 
and the assurors (which affects trust) seems a key concern for stakeholders.   
 
Trust of Assurance 
 
The value of CSD assurance can be undermined if stakeholders feel 
assurance providers cannot be trusted.  Some respondents were not inclined 
to trust assurance providers.  The value of assurance was questioned as 
Respondent i35 remarked “assurance may not mean a lot” because –  
 
“We don’t trust auditors, they have close relationships with companies 
and the reports are often biased” (Respondent T25) 
 
“… verification can be a joke” (Respondents i16) 
 
With the growth of assurance and its role of increasing stakeholders’ 
confidence in CSD (Simnett et al., 2009), assurors can act as conduits 
between companies and stakeholders (Edgley et al., 2010); however, such a 
role seems unfulfilled.  O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) found that about half of 
companies refer to assurance providers’ independence.  The issue of 
managers controlling the assurance process was also highlighted by Smith et 
al. (2011).  The assuror is subservient to the interests of the “paymaster” 
(O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005, p.227).  Also Jones and Solomon (2010, p.21) 
stated – 
 
“[management of the reportees] … set the agenda, collect and process 
the data and prepare the reports [they] also decide the level of 
assurance and pay the assurors”  
 
A respondent (T9) emphasised a high profile corporate scandal which was 
related to a major auditing failure.  Such sentiments are also found in previous 
studies in which the independence of assurance providers of CSD was 
questioned (Deegan et al., 2006).  It is noted that though there is still 
managerial capture of CSD assurance, stakeholders are becoming 
“increasingly included in the process as it matures” (Edgley et al., 2010, 
p.532).  However, to date, there is little evidence to suggest that the credibility 
of CSD assurance has been increased. 
 
Engaging stakeholders in a dialogue will increase the legitimacy of the CSD 
assurance process (O’Dwyer et al., 2011), which may increase the perceived 
independence of assurance, resulting in increased confidence and credibility 
in CSD assurance statements (Edgley et al., 2010).  In doing so, assurors 
have become agitators for stakeholders as they “engender change in 
corporate attitudes and behaviour” (Edgley et al., 2010, p.554).  However, any 
such change would only happen gradually, which is typical of any dialogic 
processes (Bebbington et al., 2007).  Thus it would be some time until 
companies could become truly stakeholder inclusive in CSD assurance.  
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More stakeholder involvement in CSD assurance may also be an educative 
process that ultimately eliminates stakeholder ignorance in this area (Edgley 
et al., 2010).  A few respondents (Respondents T7, P65, P67 and P72) 
justified their non-usage of CSD assurance with their own lack of knowledge 
in assurance.  Respondent P72 did not use CSD assurance because he said 
he was not a sophisticated user.  Notwithstanding, greater efforts by assurors 
may not convince potential users or increase their understanding of assurance 
(O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  It is hoped stakeholders may better understand CSD 
assurance as it matures. 
 
Some respondents were more inclined to trust assurance performed by 
consultant assurors but not accountants, a distinction drawn by O’Dwyer and 
Owen (2005).  The lack of trust in the judgement of accountant assurors was 
again highlighted in a recent study (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  Stakeholder 
preferences for the type of CSD assurance are further explored in the 
following section.  
 
Type of CSD Assurance 
 
Respondents were asked whether they preferred financial auditors 
(accountant assurors) or specialist environmental auditors (consultant 
assurors).  Respondents were then asked to explain their preferences through 
an open-ended question, the responses to which were then analysed and 
coded.  The results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 below. 
 
[Table 4 – Insert Here] 
 
 
 
[Table 5 – Insert Here] 
 
 
In Tables 4 and 5, data shown in the last 2 columns under “Others” was 
gathered from the qualitative responses.  Responses in the various columns 
represent explicit mention of the above issues as labelled.  13 participants 
declined to provide a response.  
 
The results in Table 4 suggest specialist environmental auditors are 
overwhelmingly preferred to financial auditors as CSD assurors.  Respondent 
T15 remarked – 
 
“the Big 4 usually take a boiler plate approach [in assurance] whereas 
specialists [assurors] will take a more involved approach”  
 
Respondent P22 stated – 
 
“discrete, non-financial related entity needed [to provide assurance] to 
increase credibility”  
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This is consistent with the finding of O’Dwyer et al. (2011) that stakeholders 
may not necessarily trust the professional judgement of accountant assurors.  
This seems contrary to the finding of Jones and Solomon (2010) that CSD 
assurance can be an extension of financial audit in view of the logic of cost 
effectiveness, coordination and time pressures.  Auditing professionals are 
known for their competence in auditing practices and their established history 
of professional services in audit engagement (Simnett et al., 2009).  In 
addition, consultant assurors may be disadvantaged as they often do not have 
the traditions of independence which accountant assurors have acquired 
through their history of financial audit (Jones and Solomon, 2010).  Especially 
among large European companies, the market for CSD assurance is 
dominated by professional service firms such as the sustainability assurance 
divisions of Big 4 professional services firms (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).   
 
To the respondents in this study, accountant assurors’ qualities did not seem 
appealing.  The results in Table 5 raise the importance of subject matter 
competence, in an area that is both specialised and complex.  Specialist 
environmental auditors were much preferred to a group that represents 
competence in auditing procedures.  This is consistent with previous findings 
that “Big N” auditors do not necessarily provide better assurance on CSD 
(Simnett et al., 2009).  Consultant assurors appealed more to stakeholders 
due to their stronger expertise in CSD. 
 
Further, comments from the respondents emphasised perceptions of 
independence in the choice of CSD assurors.  Respondent i11 indicated 
“anyone…less conflict of interest would be preferred to provide assurance”.  
Respondent i10 commented “[in CSD assurance] independence is key”.  The 
ability of accountant assurors to claim independence will help them “assert 
some authority” which in turn makes their opinions more credible (O’Dwyer et 
al., 2011, p.45).  Accounting and audit failures have reinforced the importance 
of assuror independence to stakeholders. 
 
Having explored respondents’ perceptions of key issues of CSD assurance, 
including the quality of assurance statements, the general trust in CSD 
assurance and the type of preferred assurors, the drivers that influence 
stakeholder demand for CSD assurance are examined in the next section. 
 
Factors Driving the Demand for CSD Assurance 
 
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables are first presented, followed 
by an examination of the correlations of the variables.  The results of 
estimation by logistic regression are then presented which are followed by a 
discussion with reference to the hypotheses.   
 
[Table 6 – Insert Here] 
 
 
“Value”, “FTSE4Good” and “Unbiased” are estimated using 5-point Likert 
scales.  They take a value of 1 for strongly disagree / not important and 5 for 
strongly agree / very important.  “Private” is estimated as the percentage of 
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the user’s time spent on using disclosures from private meetings.  Among all 
stakeholder groups, investing stakeholders tend to find CSD the most 
valuable and more unbiased than the other 2 groups.   Both investing and 
third sector stakeholders find FTSE4Good more important than procuring 
stakeholders.   This seems particularly important for third sector stakeholders 
who require external validation of corporate reporting, due to a distrust of 
corporations.  Tilt (1994) suggested that CSD is not seen as credible by 
NGOs and CSD assurance may help enhance the credibility of CSD. 
 
The correlations between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables and among the independent variables are presented in Table 7.  
The correlation coefficients between Assurance and Value [6], Private and 
FTSE4Good are significant and have the expected sign.  The correlation 
coefficients also suggest stakeholder type has an impact on the demand for 
CSD assurance, with a positive and significant relationship between 
Assurance and Investing, and a negative and significant relationship between 
Assurance and Procuring.  Although the variance inflation factors (VIFs) do 
not exceed 4, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem, the 
correlation coefficients do display relatively high and significant levels of 
correlation between Value and Private (-0.510**) and between stakeholder 
type, Value and Private. The relationship between Investing and Value is 
positive (r=0.372**) and the relationship between Investing and Private is 
negative (r=-0.458**).  In contrast, Procuring stakeholders place a positive 
value on private information (r=0.554**) and a negative value on the Value of 
CSD (r=-0.425**). 
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[Table 7 here] 
 
The overall explanatory power of the model [7] is satisfactory for a cross 
sectional study: Nagelkerke’s R2 is 0.32 and the Chi-square statistic (31.91) is 
highly significant.  The model predicts approximately 69% of the cases 
correctly.  Taken together, Value, FTSE4Good and Unbiased contributes 
significantly to the explanation of stakeholder demand for CSD assurance and 
provide support for the hypothesised relationships.    
 
 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Most of the independent variables, including Value, FTSE4Good and 
Unbiased, are all significant (p<0.10, p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively) and 
with the expected signs.  A positive and significant relationship was found 
between stakeholder perceptions of the Value of CSD and Assurance 
(p<0.10), providing tentative support for Hypothesis 1.  There is strong 
support for Hypothesis 2, as FTSE4Good is positively and significantly related 
to Assurance (p<0.01).  Unbiased, which reflects stakeholder perceptions of 
the degree to which CSD faithfully represents corporate social and 
environmental performance, is negatively and significantly related to 
Assurance (p<0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 3.  However findings in 
this study do not support a negative influence of access to private disclosures 
on the use of CSD assurance (Hypothesis 4).   
 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
Regression results provide tentative support to Hypothesis 1.  Results in 
Table 8 provide some support for a model of stakeholder demand for CSD 
assurance that emphasises the value of CSD.  Consistent with the Brunswik 
Lens Model, stakeholders draw on information from multiple sources to 
support decision-making which include CSD and information stemming from 
CSD assurance.  The more stakeholders value CSD, the more stakeholders 
are inclined to use CSD assurance, whose function is to enhance the 
credibility of CSD.  Results are also consistent with the observed trend that 
the provision of assurance has been increasing steadily since early 2000s 
(Perego, 2009), and that in general, there is a perceived need for assurance 
(Kuruppu and Milne, 2010).  The complementary value of both CSD and CSD 
assurance is again accentuated.  
 
Further, results in Table 8 provide strong support to Hypothesis 2.  
Stakeholder’s use of RII positively predicts stakeholder demand for CSD 
assurance.  This is consistent with the suggestion that stakeholders draw on 
information from various sources in decision-making.  In a recent study in 
which an index of CSR performance was constructed, both company 
membership in FTSE4Good and the publication of CSD were included as 
factors (Gjølberg, 2009).  Infomediaries such as FTSE4Good complement 
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CSD assurance, as both are representational measures that validate the 
fulfilment of reporting criteria by companies.  To be included in RII, companies 
need to demonstrate satisfactory performance in relation to various CSR 
dimensions (Miles et al., 2002).  Thus, companies would attain reliable and 
credible reporting, and possibly also reporting that is assured. 
 
The results also support Hypothesis 3.  The more unbiased CSD is perceived 
to be, the less inclined a stakeholder is to use CSD assurance.  The 
monitoring function of assurance on managers is again highlighted.  
Moreover, this finding is corroborated by Edgley et al. (2010) that assurance 
adds value to CSD, by helping management spot deficiencies and preventing 
companies issuing misleading information.  CSD assurance has the potential 
to perform a critical function in the corporate reporting process. 
 
Results in this study do not support Hypothesis 4.  CSD assurance may not 
be a substitute for private corporate disclosures in monitoring managers.  
Though Solomon et al. (2011) suggested “institutional investors are using the 
private reporting process to compensate for … inadequacies of public … 
reporting” (p.1119), private disclosures may remain exclusive to very few 
users.  Also, Holland (1998) stated that public information is an important 
information base; its decision usefulness may not have been totally 
disregarded.  Thus it is possible both private disclosures and CSD assurance 
are used to gauge the credibility of public reporting. 
 
Finally, the relationship between LNStaff and Assurance is insignificant, 
providing no support for the relationship between stakeholder resources and 
the demand for CSD assurance.  Neither of the stakeholder dummies 
(Investing, Third Sector) are significantly different to the omitted variable 
Procuring, suggesting no difference among stakeholder groups in terms of 
their demand for CSD assurance.   
 
Despite its potential contribution, only 56% of respondents in this study were 
found to have used CSD assurance.  Stakeholder comments regarding CSD 
assurors failing to enhance the credibility of CSD are consistent with Green 
and Li’s (2012) finding that assurance reports lack clarity.  In any case, CSD 
assurance is still maturing.  Concluding comments are presented in the next 
and final section. 
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Section 4 – Concluding Remarks 
 
This study contributes new evidence to a relatively new research area.  Jones 
and Solomon (2010) argued that more people based studies will complement 
desk-based studies in CSD assurance.  This is one of the first papers that 
investigate stakeholder perceptions of CSD assurance, in which the views of 
147 respondents in 3 key stakeholder groups were surveyed.  Stakeholder 
preferences in CSD assurance were examined in the first half of Section 3 
while demand drivers for CSD assurance were examined in the second half of 
Section 3.  In particular, 4 hypotheses related to the demand drivers, 
specifically in terms of perceptions of the value of CSD and RII, the 
unbiasedness of reporting and access to private disclosures, were developed 
and tested.   
 
Emerging pressures from stakeholders raise the importance of CSD 
assurance. Almost 75% of third sector and investing stakeholders use 
assurance while less than 50% of procurers do so.  Similar differences were 
identified where trust is a central issue for third sector stakeholders and 
investing stakeholders but not for procurers.  This suggests companies need 
to have a clear view on the target stakeholders for CSD and its resultant 
implications for CSD assurance.  A better understanding of stakeholder 
information needs will help companies attain more stakeholder relevant CSD 
and purchase more stakeholder focused assurance.   
 
Findings of this study should be of interest to managers regarding the form of 
assurance that stakeholders prefer. In this study, stakeholders clearly prefer 
specialist assurors rather than financial auditors; a perception of 
independence and subject expertise, rather than competence in auditing 
procedures, is considered key to the trustworthiness of assurors.  Also, 
assurors may include details of the assurance process in the assurance 
statements to increase credibility.  Overall, results are consistent with earlier 
studies regarding the value of non-specialist accountant assurors in 
evaluating CSD (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2007). Findings stress stakeholder 
preferences for specialist environmental assurors rather than financial 
auditors.  This highlights the underlying distrust of CSD assurance by a 
significant group of investing and third sector stakeholders.  O’Dwyer (2011) 
put forward the concern that the assurance service provided by assurors has 
a more advisory focus which can undermine the perceived independence of 
assurors.  Interestingly, “interviewees at all levels…were highly sensitive to 
and dismissive of these potential independence concerns” (O’Dwyer, 2011, 
p.1284).  In any case, while CSD assurance may add value for stakeholders 
by showing managerial commitments to credible reporting, CSD assurance 
rather than “performing any genuine accountability function by verifying the 
quality of …[CSD]” (Jones and Solomon, 2010, p.26) may well remain a 
management tool.  This is also reflected in some of the stakeholder comments 
in this study about CSD assurance not adding value. 
 
The differences in the approach adopted by the 2 groups of assurors may be 
attributed to the use of International Standard on Assurance Engagements 
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(ISAE) 3000.  Accounting assurors generally follow ISAE 3000 in assurance 
for CSD (Jones and Solomon, 2010), whereas consultant assurors may not.  
Consequently, the opinion expressed by the former group may be constrained 
by the objective and the process as defined in ISAE 3000, while consultant 
assurors can comment on other issues and adopt a different approach. 
 
Despite the findings of this research, Big 4 audit firms still account for a 
considerable market share in sustainability assurance (Environmental Leader, 
2013).  It is very likely that the preference to hire the Big 4 for CSD assurance 
is size-biased, given that large companies are inclined to hire CSD assurance 
services.  Also, Big 4 firms do try to “sell CSR consultancy services” to big 
companies (Jones and Solomon, 2010, p.28).  The disconnection between 
company preferences and stakeholder preferences for CSD assurors is 
intriguing and warrants further investigation.   
 
Notwithstanding, the landscape of CSD assurance is evolving quickly, and the 
composition of the sustainability services teams of the Big 4 appear 
increasingly diversified.  For example, PwC recently took over Viridis, an 
environmental consulting group (Foster, 2012).  Also, since 2010, Deloitte has 
been enhancing its Sustainability Services team by acquiring dcarbon8 and 
the sustainability team of Drivers Jonas Deloitte, an international real estate 
advisory firm (Deloitte, n.d.).  It appears that at present there are some non-
accountant environmental specialists working in the Sustainability Services 
teams of the Big 4 accounting/audit firms. 
 
The regression results emphasise the perceived value and quality of CSD as 
demand drivers for CSD assurance, while acknowledging the role of 
infomediaries such as FTSE4Good.  Zéghal and Ahmed (1990) argued that in 
examining corporate communication, it is essential to include all media that 
disseminate information about companies which is consistent with the 
Brunswik Lens model.  Firms are reporting social and environmental impacts 
to be included in a reputable index (Knox et al., 2005).  Both stakeholders and 
companies realise infomediaries can influence perceptions of the quality of 
CSD.  Information from various sources that include CSD assurance and 
indices can be juxtaposed to gauge a company’s social and environmental 
performance.  Results in this study suggest that Investing stakeholders 
(compared to Procuring stakeholders) tend to place a higher value on CSD, 
whereas the latter group are more prone to have access to private disclosures 
(Table 6).  Such findings seem surprising given the significant growth of 
socially responsible investment and that institutional investors are seen to be 
driving private disclosures.  Taken with the regression result that the use of 
FTSE4Good positively predicts the use of Assurance (Table 8), findings of this 
study suggest that overall stakeholders draw information from various sources 
rather than rely on any particular information sources, just as predicted by 
Brunswik Lens model. 
 
With the advent of the pilot scheme of IIRC, CSD seems to have become 
more important than ever.  One way to address stakeholder concerns 
regarding the decision usefulness of CSD is for companies to purchase CSD 
assurance.  If doubts on the credibility of CSD assurance are not resolved, the 
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value of IIRC and the value of any assured reporting may easily diminish.  In 
any case, there is still much inherent uncertainty in CSD assurance (Green 
and Li, 2012) because assurance standards are continuously evolving. 
 
To make CSD assurance useful, a 2-pronged approach seems necessary.  
Apart from the maturity of assurance standards, stakeholders may benefit 
from a better understanding of the objective and the function of CSD 
assurance.  Research evidence indicates at present the strength of assurance 
may have been overestimated by its users (Kells, 2011).  A possible 
expectations gap may not merely exist in financial audits but also in non-
financial assurance.  Jones and Solomon (2010) stated that if companies are 
to involve stakeholders more in CSD assurance and take account of 
stakeholder feedback, stakeholder information needs may be better met and a 
more accountable relationship between companies and stakeholders can be 
nurtured.  Notwithstanding, some researchers have stated that, to date, the 
educative efforts to involve stakeholders in the assurance process did not 
seem successful, and further efforts by assurors may not help users better 
understand assurance statements, unless users become more interested in 
assurance for CSD (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  It is hoped that such efforts may at 
least minimise potential misunderstanding and unrealistic expectations 
regarding CSD assurance. 
 
The analysis in this study was restricted to 3 stakeholder groups from one 
country, and procuring stakeholders account for more than half of the 
respondents.  Also, the use of assurance or otherwise was recorded as a 
response to a Yes/No question.  Future research could investigate 
stakeholder perceptions and preferences across countries with more balanced 
respondent groups in a less categorical way, resources permitting. 
 
 
Notes: 
[1] An assurance engagement is defined as one in which a practitioner 
expresses a conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the 
intended users other than the responsible party about the outcome of the 
evaluation or measurement of a subject matter against criteria (IAASB, 2004, 
p.150, cited in Deegan et al., 2006, p.332). 
[2] Corporate social disclosures (CSD) refers to public information made 
available by companies through company annual or standalone reports 
dedicated to reporting corporate social and environmental impacts.  Here, 
CSD is deemed to encompass CSR disclosures, social and environmental 
disclosures, social and environmental information, social and environmental 
reporting, sustainability reporting and Triple Bottom Line (TBL) reporting.  
[3] Respondents in this group work in private and non-governmental 
organisations.  Here, the views of respondents who were working in the public 
sector (e.g. local authorities) were gauged in their capacity as procurers. 
[4] NOP survey results suggest 77% of respondents supported ethical 
pensions. 
[5] Respondents were asked about a set of infomediaries including: other 
sustainability indices, rating by BITC, rating by AccountAbility. FTSE4Good 
provided the best fit. 
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[6] The alternative measure of users’ perceptions of the Value of CSD (Time) 
was highly correlated with Value and Private.  Substitution of Value by Time 
has little effect on the explanatory power of the model but results in a small 
reduction in the significance of the explanatory variables.  This probably 
reflects increased levels of multicollinearity. 
[7] Missing values have reduced the number of observations from 147 to 119 
cases in the regression model. 
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